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Abstract 
 
This paper considers the recommendations of the report of the Allsopp 
Committee on the adequacy of UK statistics. We raise concerns over the 
philosophy underpinning the review but, more specifically, we question whether 
the Committee’s recommendations are sufficient to operate effectively the 
present regional policy regime. In particular, the institutional arrangements that 
make up the “new localism” in regional policy have informational needs that are 
more extensive than simply monitoring performance on hitting targets. Many of 
these were simply not considered or given an inappropriately low weight in the 
Committee’s deliberations.  
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1.In tro ductio n  
Since its election in 1997, the Labour government has shown an increasing 
interest in regional policy as a means of increasing national growth and 
productivity, reducing economic disparities across space and improving 
democratic accountability at the local level. This is the “new localism”. It is 
supported by a set of institutional arrangements, known as “constrained 
discretion”, that together make up a decentralised policy delivery system (HM 
Treasury, 2001; HM Treasury et al, 2003, 2004; McVittie & Swales, 2004).1  
In the regional policy context, constrained discretion involves the 
delegation of policy delivery within England to local Regional Development 
Agencies (RDAs). The overall control rests with a set of Whitehall Departments, 
so that we have a classic principal agent problem (Dixit, 1996; Laffont & 
Martimort, 2002; Tirole, 1994; Wilson, 1990). To deliver this policy, the 
government has put in place an institutional framework “… around targets, 
funding and central guidance, tied to stronger accountability and performance 
incentives” (HM Treasury et al, 2004, p. 2). A key element of this framework is 
the appraisal and evaluation rules given in the revised Green Book (HM Treasury, 
2003).  These changes have important implications for the operation of English 
regional policy. 
Regional policy now applies to all geographical areas, rather than being 
targeted on poorly performing regions, and is part of a wider agenda to 
decentralise policy delivery. Important elements of policy-making have been 
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delegated to the RDAs, whose decisions are thought to better reflect local 
economic conditions. Also PSA targets have been introduced for regional policy 
as a whole and more specific second and third tier targets have been set for 
individual RDAs. Further Treasury guidance requires RDAs to adopt a more 
sophisticated project evaluation procedure than has been applied up to now. 
Finally, a key element of the new localism is an appeal to greater local 
accountability and democracy. These changes have very important implications 
not just for the operation of regional policy but also for informational 
requirements at a regionally-disaggregated level.  
 In 2003, the government set up an independent review, headed by 
Christopher Allsopp, to investigate, amongst other things, the data requirements 
for regional policy delivery within the framework of constrained discretion. In 
this paper we question whether the recommendations of this review (Allsopp, 
2003; 2004) are adequate to run these new institutions and therefore sufficient 
to secure an effective regional policy. We are particularly critical of the narrow 
focus of this report and its use of an informal cost-benefit approach in deciding 
whether a given set of statistics should be provided.  
The paper is organised in the following way.  The next three sections 
discuss the newly instituted English Regional Development Agencies (Section 2), 
their targets, corporate plans and strategies (Section 3), and their funding 
arrangements (Section 4).  Section 5 outlines the policy assessment procedures 
suggested in the new Green Book, and contrasts this with how regional policy 
evaluation has been carried out in the past.  Section 6 considers the Allsopp 
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recommendations, and comments on the consistency of the approach taken by 
the Allsopp Report and the requirements of policy assessment.   Section 7 is a 
short conclusion.  
2 . Re gio n al De ve lo pm e n t Age n cie s  
The Regional Development Agencies Act, 1998, set up the English RDAs as 
executive non-departmental public bodies (ENDPBs). They were formally 
launched in eight English regions on 1 April 1999. A ninth, in London, was 
established in J uly 2000  following the formation of the Greater London 
Authority. The RDAs have statutory duties to encourage economic development 
and regeneration; promote business efficiency, investment and competitiveness; 
promote employment; enhance development and application of skills relevant to 
employment; and contribute to sustainable development in each of the English 
regions.   To these statutory duties have since been added roles in the areas of 
tourism promotion, transportation, housing and planning. The Regional 
Development Agencies in England are joining Development Agencies in the 
Devolved Administrations of Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales that generally 
have a much longer history. In the Devolved Authorities the Development 
Agencies are responsible to the corresponding local Parliament or Assembly.  
In delegating policy delivery to ENDPBs, the central or devolved 
governments face principal-agent problems, where the government is the 
principal, the ENDPB the agent (Laffont and Martimort, 2002; Learmonth, 
2003). In the case of regional policy, the rationale for this delegation is that the 
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RDAs are thought to have greater local knowledge and flexibility of operation 
than central government departments. Additionally, they are not staffed by civil 
servants, have a more business-friendly approach and may be able more credibly 
to commit to the development of their own region. However, the asymmetric 
information situation sets up potential moral hazard problems, given that the 
agency’s interests will not accord perfectly with the interests of the appropriate 
government department or departments (McVittie and Swales, 2003, 2004).  In 
this sort of situation, it may be appropriate to take a “constitutional” approach 
(Buchanan, 1987; Dixit, 1996). This methodology argues that in assessing 
regional policy the government should concentrate on imposing appropriate 
constraints or rules on the operation of RDAs ex ante. In this paper we will 
consider the  institutional arrangements associated with the new localism and 
consider whether, even with the full implementation of the Allsopp 
recommendations, we will have information sufficient for their operation.  
3 .   Targe ts , Plan s  an d Strate gie s  
HM Treasury (2002, p.1) published for the period 2003 to 2006 Public 
Sector Agreements (PSAs) that “… set out around 130  demanding targets 
covering key areas of Government”. The aim is to increase accountability and 
thereby improve policy delivery. RAND Europe claim that the work of RDAs 
touches on 29 PSA targets across all departments (National Audit Office, 2003). 
PSA targets that relate very directly to regional policy or to the local delivery of 
national policy devolved or delegated to the appropriate Regional Development 
Agencies (RDAs) include those for: 
 
x the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) on neighbourhood renewal 
and social inclusion 
x the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) on building an enterprise society 
and jointly between DTI and HM Treasury on raising the rate of UK 
productivity growth over the economic cycle 
x the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) on  
improving the relative productivity performance of the lowest quartile rural 
areas 
x the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) on improving the 
productivity in the tourism, creative and leisure industries 
x the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) on increasing the employment 
rate and reducing the unemployment rate of the 30  local authority districts 
with the poorest initial labour market position and jointly between DWP and 
the Treasury on raising the UK employment rate, and reducing the 
unemployment rate, over the economic cycle. 
x HM Treasury, together with ODPM and DTI on improving the economic 
performance of all English regions and reducing the persistent gap in growth 
rates between regions. 
Note that the PSA targets cover a wide mixture of productivity, labour 
market and spatial equity goals.    Where appropriate, these PSA targets have 
been translated into more specific (second and third tier) targets for individual 
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RDAs (McVittie and Swales, 2004) and these are incorporated into the 3-year 
Corporate Plan agreed with DTI.   However, there has been criticism that the 
different tiers of targets fail to cohere and that some simplification is required 
(National Audit Office, 2003).   Exactly how this target-setting regime will work 
over the long term is still unclear. 
Plans for achieving these targets are set out within a Regional Economic 
Strategy for each of the regions.   These are 10-year strategy documents agreed 
between the RDA and other relevant local organisations involved in regional 
regeneration policy (generally referred to as stakeholders) and are formulated 
through the Regional Assemblies or Chambers. The regional Economic Strategies 
are important in that they are a formal institutional element of the local 
democratic accountability agenda. The RDA will often work in partnership with 
other local private or public sector organisations and these are consulted in the 
formulation of the Regional Economic Strategy.    
4 . Fun din g Arran ge m e n ts  
The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) brings together the funding 
for the English RDAs in a “Single Budget”, with five government departments 
making contributions. The total budget comes to £1,878 million for 2004-5, 
increasing to £2,000  million by 2005-6. This budget is distributed between the 
different RDAs by a “complex formula” (Allsopp, 2003, p. 33). An individual 
English RDA’s budget depends on its relative position on eight criteria. These 
 9
criteria and the corresponding weights that they are given in the allocation 
formula are shown in Exhibit 1. 
 One key issue should be highlighted here. The weighting that determines 
funding reflects very traditional regional policy concerns: over 70% of the total 
English RDA budget is distributed using the unemployment and social 
deprivation criteria; only 9.4% is distributed on the (inverse) productivity 
measure. Reducing unemployment rate differences across space has always been 
a major focus of regional policy, no matter what the formal justification given by 
the government in office (Armstrong and Taylor, 2000).  Therefore whilst there is 
an emphasis on the productivity agenda in some government policy documents, 
this is not backed up by the funding decisions. 
5. Po licy Appraisal an d Evaluatio n  
The policy of constrained discretion operates within the government’s 
overall policy assessment framework. There are now evaluation guidance 
documents from a number of Ministries whose work relates to that of the RSAs. 
These include the Orange, White and Magenta Books from the Treasury, DCMS, 
and the Cabinet Office respectively. However, the root source is the revised Green 
Book, where the policy assessment process is represented in terms of the 
ROAMEF cycle, which is summarised in Exhibit 2 (HM Treasury, 2003, p. 3). The 
3Rs report from ODPM (2003) gives details on how to assess the impacts of 
spatial policy in general and the DTI document “Single Programme Appraisal 
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Guidance” (SPAG) operationalises the Green Book’s recommendations for the 
English RDAs (DTI, 2003).2  
Although it is referred to as “guidance”, SPAG is rather more prescriptive 
than the Green Book. Projects above a certain minimum size have to be appraised 
by the DTI whilst those above £20  million or which are “novel, contentious or 
repercussive” (DTI, 2003, p. 19) must go through a formal additional Treasury 
appraisal.   RDAs are spending and distributing public money. At the minimum 
there is a clear public accountability issue.   
In the Green Book guidelines, a policy action must first be justified in 
general terms (Rationale), then more specific Objectives should be set. This is 
followed by an ex ante option Appraisal. If the policy passes this test, its 
execution requires Monitoring  and subsequent ex post Evaluation. An effective 
Evaluation provides Feedback  to policymakers and the opportunity for reflecting 
on the policy’s rationale, thereby starting a further round of policy assessment. 
The Green Book takes it to be axiomatic that such a process of continual 
assessment and feedback improves policy effectiveness.3
In the past, both the ex ante appraisal of individual projects for the receipt 
of Regional Selective Assistance (RSA) and the ex post evaluations of regional 
policy instruments have been undertaken using common guidelines. These were 
laid down in Annex E of the second edition of the Green Book (HM Treasury, 
1997), augmented with the recommendations from the EGRUP Review (HM 
Treasury, 1995). These assessments involved measuring expected or actual 
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behaviour against national efficiency, additionality, cost-effectiveness and project 
viability criteria.4 However, Annex 1 of the new edition of the Green Book 
advocates a full cost benefit treatment for regional policy. These 
recommendations are reiterated in the SPAG and the 3Rs documents (DTI, 2003; 
ODPM 2003). 
Further, in the revised Green Book, HM Treasury moves away from its 
previous position that regional policy is essentially redistributive. No longer is 
regional policy to be automatically assessed as if there were 100% crowding out at 
the national level. The new guidelines accept that there will be net additions to 
activity if there is a “…‘supply side’ or ‘structural’ impact, which operates by 
altering the productive capacity of the economy” (HM Treasury, 2003, p. 52). 
In assessing (appraising or evaluating) policy there are two distinct steps: 
the identification of the outcomes, and their subsequent valuation.5 We know that 
as far as valuation is concerned, the Green Book now recommends a cost benefit 
approach. However, it also gives advice on how to identify the policy outcomes. 
The impacts of regional policy are expressed in terms of additionality, which is 
now defined as the difference between the outcome with the policy and the 
counterfactual, the outcome without intervention.6 Combining advice given in the 
Green Book, SPAG and the 3Rs, the additional impact on economic activity can 
be further broken down in as follows: 
Additionality = Gross Impact - Deadweight - Substitution - Displacement - 
Leakage - Crowding Out + Multiplier Effects 
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The gross impact is simply the activity directly associated with the aided 
project. Deadweight is here defined as elements of the aided activity that would 
have gone ahead anyway, without assistance. Substitution is where a firm 
substitutes an aided activity for an unaided activity. Displacement is any 
reduction in non-aided activities that is generated as a side effect of the policy, 
through its effect on local product or labour markets, for example. Leakage is the 
proportion of the outputs or outcomes that occur outside the targeted 
geographical area or population group. Crowding out is the UK-wide impacts, 
thought to be imposed through the government’s budget constraint. It is this 
effect that underlies the judgement that only supply-side measures have a net 
effect on activity at the UK level. Multiplier effects are the indirect and induced 
effects generated by the change in intermediate and consumption demand that 
the policy has produced.    
6 . The  Allso pp Re vie w   
The First Report of the independent Review  of Statistics for Econom ic 
Policym aking, led by Christopher Allsopp, previously a member of the Monetary 
Policy Committee, focuses on the data required to support regional economic 
policy. Allsopp (2003, p.23) states that “…we ask the wider and longer-term 
questions about what kind of statistical system would be required to underpin the 
more general process of econom ic policy  devolution involving constrained 
discretion”.7 The review of regional statistics was required because both the 
accuracy and scope of the existing data provision was thought inadequate for the 
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new policy needs. This view was reinforced in the First Report (Allsopp, 2003;  
Nolan, 2003) . 
In practice Allsopp (2003, p. 91) makes recommendations “… with only 
the present regional policy agenda in mind”. He principally focuses on those 
statistics required to measure accurately and timeously the agreed key policy 
targets that are part of the constrained discretion framework. In particular, a 
large proportion of the First Report discusses the preparation of Regional 
Accounts using more securely based regional-specific data. Allsopp recommends 
deriving a regional Gross Value Added (GVA) measure at current prices using the 
production and income-based approach and a (chained) volume measure. In 
making recommendations, Allsopp (2003, p. 19) adopts “… an implicit cost-
benefit framework…. We ask whether the potential pay-off in terms of better 
economic policy is justifies the cost”. On these grounds, for example, he argues 
against generating an expenditure-based measure of regional GVA because it 
would require “… a matrix of inter-regional trade flows, for which no data exist at 
present and could only be obtained at significant cost” (Allsopp, 2003, p. 93). 
Allsopp carried out an in depth exercise, consulting many of the existing 
users of regional statistics. The report makes a large number of 
recommendations, many of which, if adopted, should improve the accuracy of UK 
regional statistics. However, in earlier sections of this paper we have described 
the new or revised institutions that now determine regional policy decision 
making and delivery, the institutions that together make up the constrained 
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discretion framework. After the Allsopp Review, do we have the appropriate data 
to support these institutions? We fear that the answer remains no. 
A number of characteristics of the Allsopp Review are problematic. The 
first is that Allsopp (2003, p. 91) interprets the remit very narrowly. His decision 
to focus only on the present regional policy agenda raises questions as to whether 
the resulting information base will be sufficient fully to support policy 
assessment. Policy appraisal necessarily involves consideration of potential 
alternative means for achieving desired objectives. The Green Book procedures 
explicitly apply to broad policies, as well as to individual programmes and 
projects. If official statistics are restricted to those required within a given policy 
context, it is unlikely that appropriate information will be available to evaluate 
that policy against alternatives. 
This causes particular difficulties for the new localism, because democratic 
accountability is an explicit element of this policy. In some parts of the UK 
regeneration policy is fully devolved. In those parts where it is not, it is the aim of 
the government to strengthen local democratic scrutiny over the delivery of this 
policy. But if this aim is to be more than empty rhetoric, information must be 
available to challenge the existing policies. Allsopp has not interpreted his brief in 
this manner. 
However, even if it were appropriate to focus solely on the operation of the 
present constrained discretion policy framework, Allsopp concentrates almost 
exclusively on the monitoring aspects of that policy. He puts great emphasis on 
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the data requirements for tracking the government’s PSA targets. This is partly 
pragmatic:  
The demand for Regional Accounts data … is a demand for data now.   The 
RDAs and devolved administrations are in place and are already involved 
in local policymaking; and while the regional PSA target has a fairly long 
time horizon, it is clearly important that systems need to be in place to 
assess performance accurately (Allsopp, 2003, p.102). 
However, as we make clear in Sections 4 and 5, the funding formula for RDAs 
and the appraisal and evaluation procedures that have been put in place are also 
key elements in the constrained discretion policy framework too. Allsopp (2003) 
gives the actual funding figures for the English RDAs, but the data requirements 
for the funding formula are not discussed.   More surprisingly, there is no 
mention of the informational needs flowing from the revised Green Book 
recommendations, the SPAG document or the 3Rs guidance. 
These are extremely important topics. As the revised Green Book states, 
regeneration policies (which include regional policy) now “… have a rationale 
defined both in terms of their impact on efficiency and equity” (HM Treasury, 
2003, p. 54). Whereas previously the impact of regional policy focussed almost 
exclusively on the recipient region, now we need to be able to identify both the 
national impacts of regional policy and also their distribution across different 
geographic areas. “The geographical focus of regeneration projects means that it 
is particularly important to assess displacement effects at both the local and 
national levels, particularly if the programme or project is substantial” (HM 
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Treasury, 2003, p. 55). Exactly the same sort of argument can be made for 
leakage, crowding out and multiplier effects too. But how are these spatial 
impacts to be measured? It seems to us inconceivable that this can be done 
properly without identifying the inter-regional trade and financial flows within 
the UK. However, as we have seen earlier in this section, Allsopp argues against 
the provision of these data.8  
Problems will also accompany any attempt to apply cost benefit 
assessment techniques to regional policy. A major advantage of the cost benefit 
approach is that shadow prices can be used to replace market prices where there 
is market failure. Ideally we require UK-wide, regionally-disaggregated, models 
to calculate these shadow prices. At present the government is silent on this. 
Even if we are to focus on the requirement for the operation of targets, the 
Allsopp Review is unbalanced. One would think, from the Allsopp Review and 
also from some Treasury documents (Balls, 2002; HM Treasury, 2001; HM 
Treasury et al, 2003), that the primary concern of regional policy were the 
government’s productivity agenda and that the critical PSA target were the 
requirement to reduce the variation in regional growth rates. However, as we 
have seen in Sections 3 and 5, RDAs have a very wide policy remit and are subject 
to a range of PSA targets. Further, their funding is primarily determined by 
unemployment and social deprivation needs, rather than any productivity 
shortfall. 
 17
 Further, for Allsopp the role for regional statistics lies almost wholly in 
the monitoring of targets. But what about target setting? Allsopp (2003, p.15) is 
fully aware that in the recent past there have been problems with target setting 
and specifically recommends involving ONS or GSS statisticians to “… advise on 
any associated measurement difficulties”. However, he does not discuss the 
informational needs for setting good (SMART) targets.9
In assessing which regional statistics should be provided, Allsopp adopts a 
very loose cost-benefit approach. He attempts to identify the costs of providing or 
improving specific elements of regional data and then makes an informal 
judgement as to whether the improved informational scope or precision 
represents value for money. “This would, therefore, give low priority to 
information that was felt to be ‘nice to know’ or that was expensive to collect” 
(Allsopp, 2003, p. 135). However, our view is that the heavy focus on the 
monitoring of existing policy targets results in a lot of information that would be 
essential for appraisal and evaluation getting allocated to the “nice to know” 
category. 
At the heart of our concerns with the Allsopp Review is that even if one is 
only interested in effective policy making, an appropriate understanding of how 
individual regional economies operate and how the regions of the UK interact as 
a spatial system is required (McVittie & Swales, 2003).   Such an understanding is 
central to the optimal operation of the financial allocation, incentive generation 
and monitoring and evaluation systems at present in place as elements of the 
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policy of constrained discretion. However, the statistical needs for such an 
understanding are given low priority in the Allsopp approach. 
Consider, for example, the Allsopp (2003, p. 111) discussion on regionally 
disaggregated price indices, where the report states that “... the clearest policy 
demands are for deflators of regional GVA for the regional PSA targets and for 
relative price levels to aid public sector pay negotiations”. No mention is made 
that data on the regional consumer price index (cpi) is required for statistically 
testing and parameterising regional wage-setting and migration functions. The 
nature of these relationships has a major impact on the effectiveness of regional 
policy (Gillespie et al, 2002).  
7. Co n clus io n s  
We are critical of the Allsopp Review for two main reasons. The first 
concerns the fact that in a democracy, the government of the day must allow for 
its own demise. It must permit, and to a certain extent facilitate, criticism of its 
own policies. Allsopp explicitly focuses solely on the cost and accuracy of the 
informational needs of the existing government’s policies. As such, it is 
fundamentally undemocratic. This is part of a wider set of concerns presently 
being voiced as to the independence of the UK Civil Service.  
The second is that even if we take its remit as stated, the Allsopp Review 
does an extremely uneven job. The government has devolved responsibility for a 
wide range of policies in England to Regional Development Agencies. For 
effective decision making, these agencies need to understand the way in which 
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the economy of their own region works. For efficient target and budget setting, 
and for the appropriate operation of the cost-benefit appraisal and evaluation 
system that HM Treasury now recommends, the government needs to know how 
the UK regional economies interact. It needs to know the nature, extent and 
geography of the positive and negative spillovers generated by policy delivered in 
a particular region. The Allsopp Report concentrates heavily on the provision of 
appropriate information in order to monitor the RDAs performance in hitting 
targets. This is only a small part of the statistical needs of the new localism. 
Allsopp undertook an independent review. It is unfortunate that he did not 
take a more wide-ranging approach, less focused on short-run, albeit pressing, 
problems. However, the Allsopp Report might be more than just a missed 
opportunity. The existence of its recommendations might hinder arguments for 
better regional data in the future.  
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Exhibit 1: The  divis io n  o f the  to tal En glish  RDA budge t, bro ke n  do w n  by the  h e adin gs  un de r w hich  the se  
have  be e n  calcu late d, 2 0 0 4 / 5, so urce  DTI 
Headings under which funding is determined Regional 
Development 
Agency 
Flat rate 
for all 
RDAs 
Populat 
ion 
GD P R & D 
Spend 
Lagging 
Rural  
areas 
Deprived 
wards 
Unemploy
ment 
Derelict 
Land 
Skills  
Fin al % 
Advantage 
West Midlands 0 .28% 0 .27% 1.29% 0 .29% 0 .33% 3.96% 5.52% 0 .44% 0 .38% 12 .74 % 
East of 
England  0 .28% 0 .27% 0 .69% 0 .00% 0 .60% 0 .78% 1.62% 0 .39% 0 .34% 4 .9 6 % 
East Midlands 0 .28% 0 .21% 0 .84% 0 .12% 0 .51% 1.95% 1.88% 0 .34% 0 .31% 6 .4 5% 
London 0 .28% 0 .36% 0 .00% 0 .28% 0 .00% 5.06% 12.39% 0 .34% 0 .35% 19 .0 7% 
North West 0 .28% 0 .35% 2.03% 0 .26% 0 .51% 7.47% 7.05% 0 .53% 0 .45% 18 .9 1% 
ONE North 
East 0 .28%        0 .13% 1.29% 0 .71% 0.23% 3.21% 6.00% 0.26% 0.20% 12 .31% 
South East 0 .28% 0 .40% 0 .56% 0 .00% 0 .66% 0 .66% 2.28% 0 .18% 0 .43% 5.4 4 % 
South West of 
England 0 .28% 0 .25% 1.17% 0 .08% 1.21% 0 .87% 1.53% 0 .28% 0 .32% 5.9 9 % 
Yorkshire 
Forward  0 .28% 0 .26% 1.52% 1.39% 0 .33% 4.15% 5.47% 0 .37% 0 .36% 14 .14 % 
Totals 2 .50 %       2 .50 % 9 .3 8 % 3 .13 % 4 .3 8 % 2 8 .13 % 4 3 .75% 3 .13 % 3 .13 % 10 0 .0 0 %
Exhibit 2 : The  go ve rn m e n t’s  ROAMEF appraisal cycle  
 
 
Obje ctive
Evaluatio n  Appraisal 
Fe e dback 
Mo n ito rin g 
IMPLEMENT
Ratio n al
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FOOTNOTES 
                                                   
1
 The term “constrained discretion comes initially from the monetary 
policy literature (Bernanke & Mishkin, 1997) but has been extended by the 
present Labour government to cover other areas of policy and specifically the 
delivery of regional policy (Balls, 2002; McVittie & Swales, 2004). 
2
 A summary of the appraisal guidance applicable to the English RDAs and 
some details of how assessment processes have been progressing in practice are 
given in National Audit Office (2003). 
3
 The key stages of the SPAG procedure are slightly different: Project 
Proposal, Appraisal, Investment Decision, Contract, Delivery, Closure, and 
Evaluation. 
4
 In this context, additionality simply measures whether the project would 
have gone ahead without the aid. The revised Green Book gives a more extended 
meaning to the term “additionality”. See the text and footnote 6. 
5
 Outcomes can be thought of as ultimate variables that enter the 
government’s Social Welfare Function, such as employment, GDP or population. 
Outputs are the intermediate steps: for example investment, innovation or skill 
acquisition.  
6
 The terms “additionality” and “deadweight” have been given slightly 
different meanings in the new Green Book than in previous official regeneration 
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policy evaluations. Additionality was previously the proportion of aided projects 
that would not have gone ahead without government assistance. Deadweight was 
the proportion of aid expenditure over and above the minimum needed for the 
aided projects to go ahead. In this terminology, all aid to non-additional projects 
is deadweight, but some of the aid to additional projects would be also be 
included in deadweight where this was greater than the minimum required for 
the project’s viability. 
7
 The Final Report (Allsopp, 2004) concentrates on the statistical needs 
that accompany the changing structure of the economy. However, it also reports 
the feedback on, and adjustments to, the recommendations made concerning 
regional statistics in the First Report.   The basic approach and central 
conclusions are unchanged. 
8
 Detailed government guidance for the RDAs on the calculation of 
additionality is promised in the 3Rs report. However, at present, (April 2004) it 
is not yet available. 
9
 SMART is an acronym for Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant and 
Timed. The need for greater care is so that the government does not again find 
itself with targets relating to rural areas where it has no agreed definition of what 
a rural area is or with targets for regional GVA growth with no statistical measure 
of this variable.  
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